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.
Educational Malpractice: Given the National 
Goals for Education, are Courts Prepared to 
Recognize this Cause of Action? 
A meeting between President Bush and the Gover-
nors resulted in the establishment of six national goals 
for education. These national goals encouraged giving 
educators increased responsibility and flexibility. This 
Note asserts that while the courts' role in fostering educa-
tional changes is unclear, it should not include recogni-
tion of the tort of "educational malpractice." Judicial 
recognition of "educational malpractice" is surrounded by 
competing policy decisions along with a wide range of 
potentially adverse consequences. The National Goals for 
Education, while setting forth a plan for rehabilitating 
our public school system, have not provided the courts the 
necessary guidelines to satisfactorily adjudicate an action 
for inadequate education. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Education has increasingly become the focus of national 
attention. At an historical education summit (Education Sum-
mit) held in Charlottesville, Virginia in October of 1989, Presi-
dent Bush and attending state governors established six na-
tional goals designed to make the United States more compet-
itive internationally.1 The President and the governors at the 
1. National Goals for Education, Press Release from Executive Office of the 
President, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 26, 1990) [hereinafter National Goals for Educa· 
tion]. The goals are as follows: 
(1) All children in America will start school ready to learn; (2) The 
high school graduation rate will increase to at least 90 percent; (3) 
American students will leave grades 4, 8, and 12 having demonstrated 
competency in challenging subject matter including English, mathematics, 
science, history, and geography; they will also have learned to use their 
minds well, so they may be prepared for responsible citizenship, further 
learning, and productive employment in our· modern economy; (4) U.S. 
students will be firSt in the world in science and mathematics achieve-
ment; (5) Every adult American will be literate and will possess the 
knowledge and skills necessary to compete in a global economy and to 
exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship; and (6) Every school 
in America will be free of drugs and violence and will offer a disciplined 
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summit recognized that education is central to our quality of 
life.2 Yet, concerns about the effectiveness of the public educa-
tional system continue to surface. An educational system where 
students are functionally illiterate upon completion of available 
programs suggests serious flaws in that system. 
The success of American society is dependent on the quali-
ty of education. Those attending the summit recognized that 
education "is at the heart of our economic strength and securi-
ty, our creativity in the arts and letters, our invention in the 
sciences, and the perpetuation of our cultural values. Education 
is the key to America's international competitiveness."3 Similar-
ly, the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education4 stated that "[t]oday, education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments."5 Education 
not only prepares students for professional training but builds 
a foundation for good citizenship.6 
Despite this recognition of education's importance, to both 
students and society, some public schools fail to instill neces-
sary skills for productivity in a contemporary society. Conse-
quently, the goals set forth at the Education Summit demand 
"[s]weeping, fundamental changes in our education sys-
tem .... "7 These changes must come not just from educators 
and students, but from all Americans;8 communities, business 
and civic groups, and state, local, and federal government each 
play a vital role in ensuring the success of our public education 
system.9 
The courts may play an important role in effectuating the 
changes necessary to attain these National Goals. 10 Restruc-
turing education requires creating powerful incentives for 
teacher performance and improvement, and real consequences 
environment conducive to learning. 
I d. 
2. Id. at 1. 
3. Id. 
4. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
5. Id. at 493. The Supreme Court indicated that great expenditures for educa-
tion and compulsory school attendance laws demonstrate the government's recogni-
tion of the importance of education. 
6. Id.; see also National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 2-4 (reference 
made in Introduction, in Goal 3, and in Goal 5). 
7. National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 1. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 1-2. 
10. National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 3-5. 
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for persistent failure. 11 The exact role courts must play in cre-
ating incentives or consequences has not been established. 
Many commentators have urged courts to recognize the tort of 
educational malpractice. 12 
II. EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE 
"Educational malpractice" is the failure to adequately edu-
cate a student; it includes the improper or inadequate instruc-
tion, testing, placement or counseling of a child.13 Educational 
malpractice claims can be divided into two distinct categories: 
(1) failure to provide an adequate education, and (2) misclassifi-
cation and improper placement within the school system.14 As 
11. Id. at 7. 
12. See Kimberly A. Wilkins, Note, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action 
in Need of a Call for Action, 22 V AI... U. L. REv. 427 (1988) (proposes that the 
theory of recovery grounded in negligence can be utilized. It also proposes a 
standard of care to aid in judicial assessment of educational malpractice complaints 
through legislative recognition of such a cause of action); Destin S. Tracy, Com-
ment, Educational Negligence: A Student's GaUBe of Action for Incompetent Academ-
ic InBtruction, 58 N.C.L. REV. 561 (1980) (urging judicial recognition of a cause of 
action for educational negligence that is limited in scope to protect both educators 
and society); Alice J. Klein, Note, Educational Malpractice: Can the Judiciary 
Remedy the Growing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 27 
(1979) [hereinafter Note, SUFFOLK U. L. REV.] (In the absence of self-instituted 
review and in an effort to stimulate educational improvements, the judiciary should 
require account;ability for failings that educators could have prevented); Case 
Comment, Belle L. Gordon, Schools and School Districts--Doe v. San Francisco 
United School District, Tort Liability for Failure to Educate, 6 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 
462 (1975) (urging that the court's ruling in Doe v. San Francisco United School 
District will perpetuate the status quo and encourage the ignoring of existing 
educational requirements); John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational 
Harms CaUBed by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1978) 
(analyzing the general policy considerations underlying court reluctance to make 
decisions concerning educational policies); Robert H. Jerry, II., Recovery in Tort for 
Educational Malpractice: Problems of Theory and Policy, 29 U. KAN. L. REv. 195 
(1981) [hereinafter Jerry] (arguing that the refusal to recognize a cause of action 
for educational malpractice is incompatible with accepted tort principles); Joan 
Blackburn, Comment, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 117 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, FORDHAM URB. L.J.] (addressing the 
alternative theories which form a basis of a suit for educational malpractice and 
suggesting that an action for negligent misrepresentation may be the best theory 
for establishing liability); Nancy L. Woods, Note, Educational Malfeasance: A New 
GaUBe of Action for Failure to Educate?, 14 TULsA L.J. 383 (1978) (considering the 
feasibility of educational malpractice in light of educational accountability and 
competency-based education movements in some states); Comment, Educational 
Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1976) (arguing that negligence suits with a 
comparative standard of care stand the most chance of success). 
13. W. PAGE KEETON ET AI..., PRosSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 
131 (5th ed. 1984). 
14. The scope of this note is limited to the first category, failure to provide an 
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of yet, no court has recognized a cause of action for failure to 
provide an adequate education.15 While there are a variety of 
theories upon which recovery may be based, 16 the most popu-
adequate education. It has been argued by several commentators that claims in the 
second category should not be labeled as true "educational malpractice" actions. See 
Richard Funston, Education Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Search of a Theory, 
18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 743, 758 (1981) [hereinafter Funston]; Edward J. Wallison, 
Jr., Note, Nonliability for Negligence in the Public SchoolB-•Educational Malprac-
tice• From Peter W. to Hoffman, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 814 (1980) (arguing that 
Hoffman v. Board of Ed. of City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 
(1979), was incorrectly labeled as an educational malpractice action). 
One court has recognized a cause of action for misplacement of a student in 
special education-not based on failure to educate a student in basic academic 
skills. B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982). In B.M., it was alleged that the 
child was misplaced in a segregated special education program. However, the court 
based its acknowledgment of the cause of action on statutory and Office of Public 
Instruction requirements alone. Id. at 427. 
15. See Poe v. Hamilton, 565 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Rich v. Ken-
tucky Country Day, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (against a private 
school); Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 762 P.2d 356 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); 
Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 744 P.2d 919 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Armstrong 
v. Data Processing Inst., Inc., 509 So.2d 1298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); DeRosa v. 
City of New York, 517 N.Y.S.2d 754 (App. Div. 1987); Agostine v. Sch. Dist., 527 
A.2d 193 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987); Denson v. Steubenville Bd. of Educ., No. 85-J-31, 
1986 WL 8239 (Ohio Ct. App. July 29, 1986); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108 
(Iowa 1986); Cavello v. Sherburne-Earlville Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 N.Y.S.2d 466 
(App. Div. 1985); Myers v. Medford Lakes Bd. of Educ., 489 A.2d 1240 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1985); Swidryk v. Saint Michael's Medical Ctr., 493 A.2d 641 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985); Torres v. Little Flower Children's Serv., 474 N.E.2d 223 
(N.Y. 1984); Village Community Sch. v. Adler, 478 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Civ. Ct. 1984); 
Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 453 A.2d 814 (Md. 1982); Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 
N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div. 1982) (action against a private school); Tubell v. Dade 
County Pub. Sch., 419 So.2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Hunter v. Bd. of 
Educ., 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982); Aubrey v. Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1306 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1981); Washington v. City of New York, 442 N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div. 1981); 
D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981); 
Helm v. Professional Children's Sch., 431 N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 1980); Hoffman 
v. Bd. of Ed., 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 
131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
16. Other theories of recovery include notions of contract law, misrepresenta-
tion, and constitutional grounds. See Comment, FORDHAM URB. L.J., supra note 12 
(misrepresentation); Charles M. Masner, Note, The ABC's of Duty: Educational 
Malpractice and the Functionally Illiterate Student, 8 GoLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 293 
(1978) (contract); Note, Educational Malpractice and the Right to Education: Should 
Compulsory Education Laws Require a Quid Pro Quo?, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 555 
(1982) (constitutional grounds). 
Also, some of these theories have been advanced in the case law. In Peter W., 
the theories of misrepresentation and negligence were the basis of the claim for 
relief. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). In Donohue, the claim was based on the theories of 
negligence and constitutional grounds. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist. 
47 N.Y.2d 440, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979). B.M.'s alleged cause of action included 
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lar theory lies in the tort principles of negligence.17 
Traditionally, a person alleging a cause of action for negli-
gence must prove four basic and necessary elements: duty, 
breach of duty, causal connection, and injury. First, the law 
must recognize a duty requiring the defendant's conduct to 
conform to certain standards (standard of care) to protect oth-
ers against unreasonable risks. Second, that duty must be 
breached by the defendant. Third, there must be a reasonably 
close causal connection between the defendant's conduct and 
the injury to the plaintiff. Fourth, actual loss or damage to the 
plaintiff must be demonstrated. 18 
A. Duty Owed 
Courts have refused to recognize a cause of action for edu-
cational malpractice because of the absence of a workable stan-
dard of care.19 The court in Peter W. v. Sari Francisco Unified 
School District held that no workable standard of care exists to 
measure an educator's teaching methods. It explained that the 
science of pedagogy promotes a multitude of conflicting views 
and approaches to educating students, and determining the 
"correct" method would be an impossible task.20 
1. Standard of care for the "Professional Educator" 
Although commentators have urged the courts to adopt a 
"workable" standard of care, the courts have been unable to 
find such a standard.21 Because the National Goals for Educa-
tion emphasize placing more responsibility on educators, courts 
may be compelled to accept the standard of care set forth for 
professionals. This standard of care requires that professionals 
possess and use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily em-
ployed by members of that particular profession in good stand-
ing.22 Courts have applied this professional standard of care 
to cases involving doctors,23 dentists,24 pharmacists,25 psychi-
claims for negligent and constitutional violations. B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 649 
P.2d 425 (1982). 
17. See JeJTY, supra note 12 (for a list of educational malpractice cases based 
on negligence). 
18. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 30. 
19. See Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61. 
20. !d. 
21. !d. at 861. 
22. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 32. 
23. See, e.g., Shumaker v. Johnson, 571 So.2d 991 (Ala. 1990); Battles v. 
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atrists,26 veterinarians,27 lawyers,26 architects and engi-
neers,29 accountants,80 abstractors of title,81 chiroprac-
tors, 82 karate teachers, 88 pilots, 84 and nurses. 85 The court 
in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District suggested 
that "[i]f doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers and other pro-
fessionals are charged with a duty owing to the public whom 
they serve, it could be said that nothing in the law precludes 
similar treatment of professional educators."86 In fact, the Na-
tional Goals for Education refer several times to educators as 
"professionals. "87 At present, however, the majority of courts 
have held educators to a lesser, quasi-professional standard.88 
Aderhold, 430 So.2d 307 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Walls v. Boyett, 226 S.W.2d 552 
(Ark. 1950); Hill v. Boughton, 1 So.2d 610 (Fla. 1941); DeLaughter v. Womack, 164 
So.2d 762 (Miss. 1964). 
24. Capps v. Manhart, 458 N.W.2d 742 (Neb. 1990); Elliott v. Owen, 393 S.E.2d 
347 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (orthodontist); Willard v. Hagemeister, 175 Cal. Rptr. 365 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Rice v. Jaskolski, 313 N.W.2d 893 (Mich. 1981). 
25. Koderick v. Snyder Brothers Drug, Inc., 413 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); French Drug Co. v. 
Jones, 367 So.2d 431 (Miss. 1978). 
26. Ray v. Ameri·Care Hosp., 400 So.2d 1127 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Cotton v. 
Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). 
27. Barlett v. MacRae, 635 P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); Ruden v. Hansen, 206 
N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1973); Posnien v. Rogers, 533 P.2d 120 (Utah 1975). 
28. See, e.g., Meller v. Bartlett, 580 A.2d 484 (Vt. 1990); Mali v. Odom, 367 
S.E.2d 166 (S.C. 1988); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 So.2d 239 
(La. 1972); Caltrider v. Weant, 128 A. 72 (Md. 1925). 
29. Robinson Redevelopment Co. v. Anderson, 547 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 
1989); Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 325 A.2d 432 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974); City 
of Eveleth v. Ruble, 225 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1974). 
30. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); 
Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 
N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308 
(N.H. 1982). 
31. Razete v. Preferred Research, Inc., 397 S.E.2d 489 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); 
Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953). 
32. Ammon v. Carpenter, 252 Cal. Rptr. 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Chamness v. 
Odum, 399 N.E.2d 238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). 
33. Fantini v. Alexander, 410 A.2d 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980). 
34. Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). 
35. Gasbarra v. St. James Hasp., 406 N.E.2d 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (defendant 
hospital and hospital nurses); Bambert v. Central Gen. Hasp., 430 N.Y.S.2d 336 
(App. Div. 1980). 
36. Donohue, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1352 (N.Y. 1979). 
37. National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 1, 7. 
38. Jay M. Pabian, Note, Educational Malpractice and Minimal Competency Test-
ing: Is There a Legal Remedy at Last?, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 101, 127 (1979). The 
defmition of a professional often excludes education. W. MOORE, THE PRoFESSIONS 
5-6 (1970) (professional preparation involves rigorous education). Public school 
teachers are described by the author as members of an aspiring semi-professional 
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Some commentators argue that educators should be held to 
the same standard applied to other professionals in light of 
educators' numerous responsibilities. These responsibilities 
include selecting materials to carry out mandatory curriculum 
objectives, establishing standards of performance, organizing 
instruction along with selecting appropriate instructional tech-
niques, and measuring and evaluating the accomplishments of 
students.39 One of the objectives of the National Goals for 
Education is to give educators (principals and teachers) the 
discretion to make more decisions. This would provide educa-
tors with greater flexibility to innovate new methods of teach-
ing, to use resources in more productive ways, and to provide 
alternate entrance paths for gifted professionals who wish to 
teach.40 With increased flexibility, the educator's responsibili-
ty toward his pupils would be enhanced, requiring the height-
ened status of "professional." 
However, there are several practical reasons for differen-
tiating educators from other recognized professionals such as 
doctors and lawyers. First, an educator is a public servant who 
receives his salary from the community budget. 41 The salary 
schedule of teachers reflects only their level of education and 
experience, rather than their reputation or status. 42 Parental 
recognition of an educator's ability or excellence will generally 
not affect the educator's salary. Second, clients exercise signifi-
cant control over the hiring and flriiig of professionals such as 
lawyers and doctors.43 Students and parents, however, exer-
cise only a limited amount of control over educators. Parents 
normally do not perceive teachers as their employees.44 
Until a "workable" standard of care is determined to be 
applicable to educators, the courts will continue to deny educa-
tional malpractice claims. 
occupation. Id. at 73. 
39. V. Hodges & W. Johnson, Legal Responsibility for Curriculum in the Basic 
Skills: Whose Job Is It?, Colorado State Univ. (Mar. 1981) (paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the Regional Conference of the Colorado Language Arts Society 
(Colorado Springs, Colo., Mar. 13-15, 1981)). 
40. National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 7. 
41. Note, SUFFOLK U. L. REV., supra note 12, at 42. 
42. Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 627, 631-32 (1973) 
(professionals rely primarily on reputation and status to determine earning capaci-
ty). 
43. Note, SUFFOLK U. L. REV., supra note 12, at 42. 
44. Hentoff, Who's to Blame? The Politics of Educational Malpractice, 6 
LEARNING 40, 43 (Oct. 1977). 
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2. Policy considerations against the recognition of a duty 
Applying a standard of care to educators is not without its 
problems. The recognition of a duty is "the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. "45 For example in 
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, the court 
relied on public policy considerations for not recognizing a 
duty.46 
The recognition of a duty to adequately educate would 
expose educators to countless claims, real or imagined. This 
burden would cost society not only time and money, 47 but also 
prospective instructors. The drafters of the National Goals for 
Education recognize that the key to the restructuring of our 
nation's public education system is the capability to attract and 
keep quality teachers who have educational skills and knowl-
edge of up-to-date technology.48 The recognition of educational 
malpractice claims would require administrators to tighten the 
policies on hiring and certification of potential educators. Yet, 
the National Goals of Education encourage adoption of policies 
to attract more qualified teachers from diverse backgrounds. 49 
The court in Donohue argued that an educational malprac-
tice claim would constitute unwarranted judicial intrusion not 
only into broad educational policies, but more importantly, into 
the day-to-day implementation of such policies.50 Such an in-
trusion is contrary to the need to allow greater flexibility for edu-
cators to innovate new ways to improve learning.51 The desire 
for increased flexibility, 52 coupled with the inherently impre-
45. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1976) (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)). 
46. Id. at 861. The court stated, "These recognized policy considerations alone 
negate an actionable 'duty of care' in persons and agencies who administer the 
academic phases of the public educational process." 
47. Id. 
48. National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 7. 
49. Id. 
50. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y. 
1979). 
51. National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 7. 
52. The court in Peter W. stated that "[t]he science of pedagogy ... is fraught 
with different and conflicting theories of how or what a child should be taught, 
and any layman might-and commonly does-have his own emphatic views on the 
subject." Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860·61 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
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cise nature of education, conflicts with the rigidity and absolute 
nature of court made rules. Therefore, the courts have resisted 
applying a single standard of care to educators in light of the 
host of variable factors which influence the process of educa-
tion.68 
B. Remaining Elements of Negligence 
Even if a plaintiff is able to establish a workable standard 
of care he must still satisfy the remaining three elements of 
negligence: breach of duty, causal connection between the 
defendant's conduct and the resulting injury to plaintiff, and 
actual loss or damage to plaintiff. 
1. Breach of duty 
Assuming a professional standard of care applies, the 
plaintiff must establish that the defendant failed to use known 
and available educational alternatives. 54 This proof must be 
established by an "expert witness," someone who is an expert 
in the profession, such as a teacher or administrator. 55 How-
ever, problems would arise since even educators disagree on 
what philosophies and methods of education are most appropri-
ate. 56 The choice between various methods of education de-
pends on a myriad of factors.57 Therefore, expert witnesses 
could most certainly be located to support each side of the case. 
Also, due to the different approaches taken by the various dis-
tricts and states, the "locality rule", which requires that the 
expert witness be an authority in the same geographic location 
as the defendant, would seem to be necessary.58 However, 
some jurisdictions have discarded the locality rule altogether 
53. Id. at 861. 
54. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 32. 
55. Id. at 188 (to prevail in a malpractice case the plaintiff must establish 
through expert testimony both the standard of care and the fact that the 
defendant's conduct did not measure up to that standard); see, e.g., Campbell v. 
Palmer, 568 A.2d 1064, 1067 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (testimony of expert is neces-
sary to establish both standard of proper professional skill or care on the part of 
physician and that defendant failed to conform to that standard of care). 
56. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61. 
57. Id. One such factor is the recognition that there are two duties involved in 
malpractice cases. There is the duty of the educator to teach which is coupled with 
a duty to learn on the part of the student. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (App. Div.), affd 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979). 
58. Deborah D. Dye, Note, Educational Malp1Tl£tice: A Cause of Action that 
Failed to Pass the Test, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 499, 506 (1987). 
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having noticed that, in medical malpractice suits, physicians 
from the same area are reluctant to testify against a col-
league.69 There is no reason to believe that an educator would 
be less reluctant to testify against another educator. 
To further complicate the finding of a breach of duty, the 
National Goals for Education have stressed the desire to give 
educators greater flexibility to serve the needs of a diverse body 
of students.60 The potential of subjecting an educator's un-
proven methods to laymen Gudges and juries) and experts who 
have different theories of education may stifle innovation and 
creativity. Therefore, the questions remain: are courts in any 
position to determine "the correct way" to educate, and when 
has an educator breached his duty to educate? 
2. Causal connection between conduct and injury 
The plaintiff must also prove that the educator's breach of 
duty was a factual and proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. 
The defendant's conduct is considered the factual cause of the 
injury if (1) the event would not have occurred but for the 
defendant's conduct ("but for" test), and (2) defendant's conduct 
is more than an insignificant contribution to the result ("sub-
stantial-factor" test).61 Factual causation is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to prove due to a multitude of factors such as 
the student's motivation, attitude, temperament, and past ex-
perience, along with other mental, social and economic fac-
tors.62 
Proximate cause deals with how far courts will extend 
liability. A defendant's conduct is the proximate cause if it is so 
closely connected with the result, and of such significance, that 
the law is justified in imposing liability.63 Proving proximate 
causation is complicated by the multitude of factors outside the 
educator's control which influence a students inability to 
59. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 32 (some jurisdictions have replaced the 
"locality rule" with a general national standard, especially in the case of medical special-
ists); see, e.g., Paintiff v. Parkersburg, 345 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1986) (West Virginia 
no longer applies the locality rule in medical malpractice suits because physicians 
from the same area are reluctant to testify against a colleague). 
60. National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 1, 7. 
61. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 41. 
62. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353-55 (N.Y. 
1979) See also, Funston, supra note 14, at 784-90 (causation is the greatest im-
pediment in "educational malpractice" suits). 
63. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 41. 
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learn.64 Clearly, the act of one particular teacher in a school 
system cannot cause a student to graduate from high school 
functionally illiterate. As an Alaskan court explained, the level 
of learning that a child might have reached if an educator had 
not breached his duty is impossible to assess; therefore, the 
determination of proximate cause is beyond the court's abili-
ty.65 
3. Injury 
The final element necessary for the tort of negligence is 
actual loss or damage suffered by the plaintiff. As stated in 
Donohue, "who can in good faith deny that a student who upon 
graduation from high school cannot comprehend simple 
English-a deficiency allegedly attributable to the negligence of 
his educators-has not in some fashion been 'injured'.»>O How-
ever, some courts have refused to recognize injury resulting 
from a failure to educate as an "injury" within the meaning of 
tort law.67 
Court recognition of educational deficiency as tort injury 
creates two basic problems.68 First, the plaintiff has lost what 
amounts to an expectancy interest or a failure to receive a 
benefit.69 The issue of not receiving an adequate education is 
analogous to the issue resolved in H.R. Moch Co., Inc. u. 
Rensselaer Water Co., where the court held that a municipal 
contractor's failure to furnish sufficient water to adequately 
fight fires was a denial of a benefit, not a commission of a legal 
wrong. 70 What was lost was an expectancy interest, for which 
the court does not recognize a right of redress. Likewise, in an 
educational malpractice suit the injury to the plaintiff is the 
lost expectancy interest. 
Second, the calculation of damages for non-learning would 
be virtually impossible. 71 Damages would be based on future 
earnings which are mere expectations and are highly specula-
64. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1976). 
65. D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 556 
(Alaska 1981). 
66. Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354. 
67. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862; Donohue, 391 N.E.2d 1352. 
68. Funston, supra note 14, at 783-84. 
69. Id. 
70. H.R. Moch, 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928). 
71. Funston, supra note 14, at 784. 
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tive. In one case, Sioux Indian children were denied recovery 
for lost educational benefits because the amount of the loss 
could not be determined with sufficient accuracy.72 Education 
up to a particular level does not guarantee a particular in-
come, 78 and damages resulting from a lack of education are 
difficult to assess. Therefore, the task of proving actual injury 
continues to be an obstacle for those who advocate recognition 
of educational malpractice as a legal cause of action. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Many policy considerations are at the center of a court's 
decision of whether to recognize a claim for educational mal-
practice. 74 The National Goals for Education encourage re-
structuring of the public education system to make teachers 
and administrators more accountable. However, in light of the 
many other aspirations set forth in the National Goals of Edu-
cation, this plea for increased accountability must be balanced 
with the need for greater flexibility. The courts have been un-
able to adequately balance these seemingly contradictory needs. 
Judicial recognition of a cause of action for "educational 
malpractice" would burden an already inadequate education 
system. Holding educators accountable for their actions is de-
sirable. Deciding the extent and enforcement of standards to 
increase accountability should not be left to the courts. These 
issues are largely political and are properly left to the legisla-
tive process. The hoped for improvements sought by the Na-
tional Goals for Education require all Americans to take part in 
the restructuring of the public education system. 76 All par-
ties-students, parents, educators, and legislators-need to 
take concrete steps to police and improve public education. If 
society does not take steps to restructure the faltering public 
school system, it runs the risk that the courts, with all the 
undesirable consequences accompanying such an action, may 
decide for us. 
Russell K. Smith 
72. Id. (citing Sioux Tribe v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 16 (1936), cert. denied, 
302 u.s. 740 (1937)). 
73. /d. 
74. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y. 
1979). 
75. National Goals for Education, supra note 1. 
